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[ level of self-sufficiency that is reasonable in his case; it then suggests an appropriate standard of review. Part III of the comment discusses the proper judicial considerations for determining whether a child's educational program must include a particular educational service alleged to be necessary to achieve maximum self-sufficiency in the specific case. 14 The comment concludes that Congress or the Department of Education should clearly state that educational programs administered under the Act must include, at a minimum, every service reasonably aimed at making the individual child self-sufficient.1
I. THE STRUCTURE OF THE ACT
The Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 197516 is primarily a funding vehicle to assist the states in providing education for handicapped children.' 7 To receive federal funds, states must meet the requirements of the Act, the most explicit of which are procedural.' 8 For example, a recipient state's plan for educating handicapped children must be approved by the Secretary of Education.' 9 In addition, the state must demonstrate to the Secretary that it "has in effect a policy that assures all handicapped children the right to a free appropriate public education." 20 The state is required to describe in detail the policies and procedures it undertakes to assure that right. 2 1 It must also establish priorities for the education of handicapped children, 2 2 and must ensure that local educational agencies will implement the individualized education programs mandated by the Act. 23 Finally, the state must demonstrate that its evaluation and placement procedures are not racially or culturally discriminatory. Decisions concerning a particular child's education are made on the basis of an individualized education program-a written program developed at a meeting of educators, the child, and his parents, detailing the child's present educational performance level, his appropriate educational objectives and means to achieve those objectives, and proper criteria for evaluating the child's progress. 25 The Act calls for annual review and revision of the individualized program 26 and specifies procedural safeguards designed to maximize parental involvement in the placement decision. A child's parents or guardian, for example, must be given notice and an opportunity to present complaints whenever the local agency changes or refuses to change its evaluation of the child. 27 If the guardian or parents make a complaint, they are entitled to an impartial hearing before a hearing examiner or the state educational agency. 2 8 Any aggrieved party may appeal from the examiner to the state agency, and from the state agency to a state or federal court. 
II. INTERPRETING THE SUBSTANTIVE REQUIREMENTS OF THE ACT

A. The Substantive Vagueness of the Act.
The substantive requirements imposed by the Act are few, and they are broadly stated. In addition to mandating a "free appropriate education, '30 the Act requires states to establish "a goal of providing full educational opportunity to all handicapped children." 31 The most explicit substantive requirement is that handicapped children be educated with nonhandicapped children "to the maximum extent appropriate." 32 This requirement, known as mainstreaming, was included in
Id. § 1401(19).
Id. § 1414(a)(5).
Id. § 1415(b)(1)(C).
28. Id. § 1415(b)(2). 29. Id. § 1415(e)(2). 30. Id. § 1412(2)(B). The Act defines a "free appropriate education" as "special education" and related services that (A) have been provided at public expense, under public supervision and direction, and without charge, (B) meet the standards of the State educational agency, (C) include an appropriate preschool, elementary, or secondary school education in the State involved, and (D) are provided in conformity with the individualized education program required under section 1414(a)(5) of this title. Id. § 1401(18); see 45 C.F.R. § 121a.4 (1979) . "Special education" is defined as "specially designed instruction, at no cost to parents or guardians, to meet the unique needs of a handicapped child, including classroom instruction, instruction in physical education, home instruction, and instruction in hospitals and institutions.' 20 U.S.C. § 1401(16) (1976) ; see 45 C.F.R. § 121a.14(a)(1) (1979) . "Related services" are those that "may be required to assist a handicapped child to benefit from special education .. the statutory language only after extensive debate. 33 In light of the highly individualized nature of education for the handicapped, 34 and in light of the difficulty with which even so broad a provision as mainstreaming was enacted, it is not surprising that Congress did not include more detailed substantive requirements in the Act. 35 The Act's substantive vagueness has produced conflict within and among courts faced with determining whether a handicapped child's program of education satisfies the Act. 36 The most dramatic example is Battle v. Pennsylvania, 37 in which handicapped children and their parents sued in federal district court, alleging that Pennsylvania's policy of providing no more than 180 days of school annually for any child violated the children's rights under the Act. The district court concluded that the Act entitled the plaintiffs to an education aimed at developing maximum self-sufficiency within the limitations of their handicaps.
38
The district court then held that because the lengthy interruptions in training occasioned by the 180-day rule caused the handicapped children to lose the skills they had acquired, the rule ran afoul of their right to an "appropriate" education.
39
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed, but held that the Act did not specifically require the goal of self-sufficiency: "Rather, the Act contemplates that in the first instance each state shall have the responsibility of setting individual educational goals and reasonable 33. See H.1. REP. No. 332, 94th Cong., 1st Seas. 9 (1975). The policy of educating handicapped children in the same teaching environment as normal children is widely accepted as a beneficial approach to the education of the handicapped. The main objection to the Act's requirement of mainstreaming is that government should not overly restrict educators in making the means to attain these goals."' 40 The court concluded that the 180-day rule was invalid because it precluded the state from providing the individualized treatment required by the Act.4
1 Judge Sloviter concurred in the result, arguing that the Act requires self-sufficiency to be the ultimate goal but allows the states freedom in implementing that goal.4 2 For this reason Judge Sloviter agreed with the district court's ruling that the 180-day rule violated the children's right to a free appropriate public education.4
3 Judge Sloviter's conclusion was somewhat more restrictive than the district court's, however, she recognized the need to limit the children's right to that degree of self-sufficiency possible within the reasonable limits of state resources. 44 Battle v. Pennsylvania thus exemplifies the conflict over the degree to which educational programs funded under the Act must be aimed at achieving self-sufficiency.
B. Congressional Intent.
The Battle court was unanimous in calling for an authoritative determination of the goal of the Act. The majority noted that in refusing to decide whether the Act requires self-sufficiency as the goal of a handicapped child's education, it was probably only delaying a decision on the matter. 45 Judge Sloviter based her opinion on her belief that "elucidation of the principal goal of the statute is essential to any interpretation of its provisions, whether they are substantive or procedural."' 6 An analysis of the Act's goal must begin with an examination of its legislative history.
Possible Interpretations.
One interpretation of the Act is that Congress intended to require states to provide children with all educational services necessary to achieve self-sufficiency in every case, regardless of expense or other limitations. But the legislative history of the Act suggests that Congress did not intend to adopt such an extreme position. Congress first considered whether handicapped children have 40 1127 (1979) . See also the authorities cited in note 6 supra. a right to an education aimed at self-sufficiency. 47 Although it is not clear whether there is a constitutional right to such a thoroughgoing education, 48 Congress believed that handicapped children do have the right to some minimum level of education. 49 While making frequent mention of the goal of self-sufficiency, the Act's legislative history con- Congress's desire to avoid an approach that would require every imaginable service for the handicapped, but its legislative history makes plain that Congress also meant to further the national goal of self-sufficiency for handicapped Americans. 5 3 The Act was not intended, however, to create an absolute statutory right to an education resulting in self-sufficiency; Congress was aware that the issue was too complex to warrant such a broad and indiscriminate approach.
54
Congress's awareness of the need to preserve the local nature of education 55 also indicates that the Act was not meant to impose a rigid requirement of self-sufficiency on the states. Federal involvement in education erodes the freedom of the states to make policy in that area, and that erosion occurs regardless of whether the federal involvement is aimed at the needs of an identifiable group or at providing federal funds for education in general. 5 Failure to provide appropriate educational services for all handicapped children results in public agencies and taxpayers spending billions of dollars over the lifetime of these individuals to maintain them as dependents in minimally acceptable life styles. Yet, providing appropriate educational services now means that many of these individuals will be able to become a contributing part of our society, and they will not have to depend on subsistence payments from public funds. 121 CONG. REc. 19,492 (1975) but once it does, a contractual relationship arises that obligates the state to accept the conditions of the federal grant. 5 9 When a state accepts federal funds under the Act, the provisions of the Act therefore supersede conflicting state law. 60 Courts have recognized that the conditions imposed by the Act greatly restrict local and state discretion in the area of education.
61
Aware of the Act's potentially destructive impact on local decision-making, the drafters of the Act were concerned that it reflect due regard for state and local sovereignty. 62 In other education statutes, Congress has expressed this same interest in preserving the freedom of action of state and local authorities. 63 Congress's concern that education remain primarily a local prerogative indicates that Congress did not intend the Act to impose on the states a rigid program mandating that they go to all extremes to provide handicapped children with an education aimed at self-sufficiency.
Another interpretation of congressional intent is that the Act merely encourages states to educate handicapped children toward selfsufficiency. 64 Under this view, the Act never requires that a child's educational program be aimed at self-sufficiency; the state complies with the Act simply by providing the handicapped child with some educational program. The legislative history suggests, however, that Congress intended more than simple encouragement. 65 Congress was well aware that, because of the cost of caring for handicapped Americans who are dependent on society for support, the national interest is well served by making the handicapped as self-sufficient as possible. 66 Congress's growing concern for the plight of the handicapped is re- educational programs funded under the Act to be aimed at achieving self-sufficiency.
A Preferred Interpretation.
The most satisfactory view is that Congress, in establishing the goal of full educational opportunity, intended to require states to provide every feasible service reasonably necessary to enable the handicapped child to reach his maximum educational potential. Full educational opportunity will entail different goals and therefore different services for each child, depending on the severity of his handicap.
Under this view, severely handicapped children must receive whatever services are reasonably necessary to move them toward selfsufficiency, even if actual attainment of self-sufficiency is impossible. For these children maximum educational achievement may consist of merely learning to dress themselves, feed themselves, and toilet themselves. 70 Moderately handicapped children, too, must receive all services necessary to enable them to achieve the maximum level of selfsufficiency reasonable in each case. 71 As the educational objective for these children, self-sufficiency may entail learning to buy groceries, to use public transportation, or to live in a community environment.
72
Mildly handicapped children who achieve self-sufficiency still have the right to full educational opportunity. For these children the state must provide whatever additional services are necessary to enable them to reach their maximum educational potential, even if these serv-69. Self-sufficiency does not necessarily mean the maximum self-sufficiency of which a particular child is capable. All 72. An indication of the concrete educational goals typically set for these moderately handicapped children can be found in the factual background of cases litigated under the Act. See, e.g., New York State Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Carey, 612 F.2d 644, 646 & n.1 (2d Cir. 1979) (the board of education provided programs to teach social and occupational skills enabling the moderately handicapped to function in the community and in normal occupational settings).
[Vol. 1981:516 ices are beyond the goal of self-sufficiency. 73 These services will be aimed at minimizing the detrimental effects of the handicap. 74 For example, in the case of an eleventh-grade child of normal intelligence who reads at an eighth-grade level because of a hearing defect, the state must provide those services necessary to enable the child to read at an eleventh-grade level even though an eighth-grade reading level is enough to make the child self-sufficient. On the other hand, the state is not required to provide the handicapped child with educational services that are not provided to nonhandicapped children of comparable age or intelligence. 75 Thus the state need not provide an advanced calculus course for a handicapped child who has an unusually high potential, when such a calculus course is not available to nonhandicapped children.
Because the most divisive litigation under the Act often involves children who are severely or moderately handicapped, 76 for whom the goal of self-sufficiency is all-important, that class of cases provides the primary perspective from which this comment will analyze the criteria that determine whether a child's educational program fulfills the Act's requirement of full educational opportunity. 77 For these children the Act sets the goal of achieving the maximum self-sufficiency that is reasonable under the circumstances, but lets the states and local educational agencies determine the particular educational services that are necessary to achieve that goal in each individual case. In reviewing cases arising under the Act, courts must be aware of the competing concerns of the Congress that drafted the Act. The Act's language and legislative history indicate that Congress intended to secure to handicapped children the right to an appropriate education. But Congress was also aware that concern for the individual child's welfare must be balanced against the principle of preserving the local nature of education in order to prevent unnecessary judicial intrusion into state and local decisions about educational policy. 0 Courts deciding cases concerning an individual child's educational program must integrate these competing considerations. An effective understanding of the court's relationship with the locality requires a closer look at the impact a court's ruling may have on a state or local school district.
Because the Act does not provide for the entire cost of a handicapped child's education, 81 a court's decision that a child must be given a particular educational service may drain state and local funds 82 and create an expensive need for competent personnel. 83 The financial bur- In that case the majority held that the Act does not set a specific goal of self-sufficiency, but rather leaves the states to set individual goals for each child. 629 F.2d at 278. Judge Sloviter, like the district court below, argued that the Act does require the ultimate goal of self-sufficiency. Id. at 284, 286-87 (Sloviter, J., concurring and dissenting in part).
The Battle majority suggested that a policy statement by the Department of Education to the effect that the Act's goal is self-sufficiency for the handicapped would be helpful. Id. at 281 (majority opinion). A court is more willing to construe a statute according to congressional intent when the interpretation the court approves has been adopted by the agency charged with the primary responsibility for administering the legislation, in light of its special experience and expertise. Los Angeles Mailers Local 9 v. NLRB, 311 F. 79. See notes 47-54 supra and accompanying text. 80. The criteria that determine the extent of a child's rights under the Act are discussed at notes 113-58 infra and accompanying text. For an indication of Congress's concern for federalism, see notes 63-64 supra and accompanying text.
81. Section 1411(a)(1) of the Act determines the amount of funds a state receives by multiplying the number of handicapped students the state serves by a fixed dollar amount that is not necessarily related to the actual cost of an individual child's education. 20 U.S.C. § 1411(a)(l) (1976 On the other hand, the Act clearly requires that states make certain expenditures, and provides federal funds in order to compensate for increased local costs. 86 The Act is sensitive to a state's legitimate financial concerns; "appropriate education" does not mean the best education a state could give if it had unlimited financial resources. 87 Rather, "appropriate education" means that available funds must be spent equitably so that handicapped children do not bear the brunt of a state's financial limitations. 88 Imposing federal requirements on the states limits local freedom in other ways as well. Because education generally reflects local values and interests, 89 a court should bear in mind that its judgment may to some degree be viewed as second-guessing collective community wisdom. 90 The importance of local control of education should encourage 
1980).
When damages are sought in a federal court, the court must consider whether the eleventh amendment limits the power of the federal judiciary to award damages under the Act. 95 The administrative remedies that the Act provides are perhaps the best way to reconcile the need to maintain local control over education with the need to protect each child's rights. Generally, when the Act's administrative remedies are adequate to handle the plaintiffs claim, they must be exhausted before a party can seek redress in court. 97 In those cases in which exhaustion of the Act's administrative remedies cannot be required, a court may nonetheless compel the parties to proceed through administrative channels before seeking judicial action. 98 Under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, 99 a court properly having jurisdiction over a case may refer the matter to an administrative agency' 0 0 when the case involves questions that are within the agency's special field of expertise and outside the competence of the court.' 0 ' The main purpose of the doctrine is to avoid the conflict between court and administrative agency that may arise from the court's lack of expertise in the area or inexperience with agency policy. 02 A court may also refer a case arising under the Act to an administrative decision-maker when the trial process itself threatens the welfare of the handicapped child in a way that an administrative 98. This method of proceeding may be proper when the court feels that although a prior administrative proceeding was ineffective or was not carried out in good faith, such a proceeding can now be used with confidence under the watchful eye of the court. See Krass, supra note 34, at 1052. and agency'°4 and conserving judicial resources.°5 The difficult evidentiary questions relating to educational and fiscal policy likely to arise in cases under the Act 0 6 further suggest the benefit of deferral to an agency, though for the most part courts are competent to resolve these questions. 10 7 Despite these cautionary considerations, a court should not be hesitant to exercise the overseeing role Congress intended it to have. 08 Va. 1979) . A court must rely on expert testimony in most cases, especially when medical and psychological evaluations are at issue. Yet a court should be careful not to rely too heavily on expert testimony in determining the ultimate issue of whether all feasible services necessary for self-sufficiency have been provided in a particular case. For example, in In re "A" Family, 602 P.2d 157, 167 (Mont. 1979), the court held that it was inappropriate for counselfor the superintendent of public instruction to request at trial the opinion of a physician about the appropriateness of the plaintiff child's placement, where the placement had become final and had been approved by hearing officers at both the local level and the superintendent level A court must also be cautious when experts disagree about which rehabilitative services constitute the "state of the Act. 108. Section 5(a) of the Act provides for ultimate review of a placement decision by a state or federal court, but does not specify the scope of review. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(2) (1976). Courts generally have made a broad review both of procedural and substantive issues. The statutory language supports the Courts' broad approach. See Note, supra note 11, at 147-48. An extensive scope of review is necessary because the Act, although giving wide authority to state and local agencies to create individual education programs, does not provide clear substantive guidelines. See notes 16-44 supra and accompanying text. The Act therefore requires readily available judicial review to ensure that states and localities, while adhering to the letter of the Act's procedural requirements, do not frustrate the Act's substantive goals. See Note, supra note 46, at 1109-10.
Special considerations of federalism come into play when cases under the Act are brought in federal court. See note 84 supra. In Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), the Supreme Court held that in order to avoid undue federal intrusion into state decision-making, federal courts will not enjoin state-court criminal proceedings. Congress may simply have expected too much of local educational agencies; 1 0 9 it is therefore sometimes necessary for courts to step in.
In rendering a decision on the merits, a court should require the handicapped plaintiff to make a prima facie showing that his educational program does not include all components necessary to achieve the maximum self-sufficiency reasonable in his case. The burden then shifts to the institutional defendant to show that the Act does not require the child's program to include the disputed service, because the particular service is infeasible, unreasonable, or otherwise exceeds the full educational opportunity required by the Act. 1 "' In all cases, the Act's goal of the maximum self-sufficiency reasonable in the particular case remains firm. Thus, even when the Act does not require that a particular service be a part of the child's educational program, the Act does require self-sufficiency to be the aim of the remaining services comprising the child's program.I This standard of review would give complainants ready access to the courts while providing local educational authorities with ample opportunity to justify their exercise of discretion. Whether the court adopts this or some other standard of review, the court should consider the broad concern of preserving the local nature of education as it weighs the criteria that determine whether an individual child's educational program must include a particular service, and therefore whether the state or local educational agency is providing an education aimed at self-sufficiency in compliance with the Act." 111. See notes 69-78 supra and accompanying text. 112. One court has suggested that, as long as the child's interests are not harmed, a court should allow the local agency leeway in placing the child as necessary to ensure continued receipt
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III. CONSIDERATIONS FOR DETERMINING WHETHER A CHILD'S EDUCATIONAL PROGRAM MUST INCLUDE A
PARTICULAR SERVICE
A court must consider several aspects of a situation when deciding whether the Act requires a particular educational service to be included in a child's educational program. Some of these are unique to the particular case while others represent broader concerns present in virtually every case arising under the Act. 1 13
A. The Individual Child
The first determination a court must make is whether the child is in fact handicapped within the meaning of the Act. 1 14 The Act provides no remedy for those children not considered handicapped. If the court finds that the child was handicapped at the time of the placement decision, it must then decide whether the defendants knew or had rea- Tex. 1978 ) (finding that the school district had engaged in a "calculated, deliberate effort to avoid its legal responsibility" to provide an adequate education to the plaintiff under the Reha-Once it is clear that the child is handicapped, the court must determine whether the child's affliction makes special educational services necessary. 1 18 Although the Act covers a wide variety of disabilities, 1 1 9 there may be cases in which the child can benefit from the educational programs under the Act only if he receives services that are outside the Act's purview.' 20 A court should not require a school district to provide a service if the effectiveness of that service depends upon another service that is not required by the Act and is otherwise unavailable. 12 1
In most cases, however, the mere fact that a child needs non-educational services does not relieve the state of its duty under the Act. 122 After the court has determined that the child needs educational or therapeutic services, it must consider the degree of self-sufficiency that the child can potentially achieve.' 23 The greater the degree of potential 119. See note 3 supra. 120. Such a situation may arise, for example, in the case of a child whose complete lack of an immune response requires him to live in a bacteriologically sterile environment. See The Bubble Boy, NEWSWEEK, June 5, 1978, at 16. While the Act should require in-home instruction for the child, it should not require the school to construct on school property a sterile "bubble house" like that in the child's home. Nonetheless, given the courts' generally broad interpretation of the Act, it would not be surprising for a court to decide that the school must in fact provide such a structure. Cf. Tatro v. Texas, 481 F. Supp. 1224 (N.D. Tex. 1979 , vacatedandremanded, 625 F.2d 557 (5th Cir. 1980) (In Tatro the district court held that the Act did not require the school district to provide catheterization for the plaintiffs child. Because of a neurogenic bladder condition, the child needed catheterization every three or four hours during the school day. On appeal, the court held that catheterization is a "supportive service" required by the Act. 625 F.2d at 562). The "related services" required by the Act include transportation and supportive services for diagnostic and evaluative purposes. See 20 U.S.C. § 1401(17) (1976) . See also 45 C.F.R. § 121a.13 (1979) . 121. If the child's parents, however, are willing to provide the service not required by the Act, the court should be free to order the school district to provide the accompanying service. 123. The emphasis of this comment is upon those cases in which maximum self-sufficiency satisfies the goal of full educational opportunity. Handicapped children who achieve self-sufficiency have the right to receive, as part of their full educational opportunity, whatever services are DUKE LAWIOUR.VAL [Vol. 1981:516 self-sufficiency, the more important it is that the school be required to make every reasonable effort toward that end. 124 The court must also weigh the financial resources of the school system or state. 1 38 A particular educational service cannot be mandatory when the school system simply cannot afford to provide the service.' 39 Moreover, the level of local educational and administrative expertise may often make infeasible a particular service that is necessary to achieve maximum self-sufficiency. 40 To make that service a mandatory part of the child's educational program is useless when the school lacks the professional skill and management necessary to implement that service. A school that can afford to hire the appropriate personnel, however, must do so.
141
C. Compliance with Statutory Procedure.
The Act establishes procedures to be followed in diagnosing handicaps, designing individualized education programs, and administering the remedial provisions available to aggrieved children.' 42 In determining the adequacy of a child's education under the Act, a court should consider the actual procedure that the school used in designing the educational program at issue. The more questionable the school's adherence to the Act's procedural requirements was, the less likely it is that the school dealt with the child in good faith. 43 The school's lack of good faith in turn detracts from the reliability of the individualized educational program that the school developed. 144 When it is unclear whether the school knew that the child was handicapped, the school's proper use of procedure becomes especially important in determining 138. The financial impact of a child's educational program may also be a factor in allocating the burden of proof. See Comment, supra note 110, at 421 (suggesting placing a heavier burden of persuasion on the school district if its placement decision is more convenient in terms of cost or resources Committee is aware that there is a shortage of fully qualified personnel trained to serve all handicapped children in educational programs"); Note, supra note 46, at 1110. The history of the Act's implementing regulations suggests that it is appropriate for a court to consider the local availability of educational services. As initially proposed, the regulations would have required the school district to determine a child's individualized education program "without regard to the availability of those services." 41 Fed. Reg. 56,970 (1976) . The final regulation, however, deleted the reference to the availability of services. 42 C.F.R. § 121a.346(c) (1979 whether the school had reason to know of the handicap. 145 That determination affects the degree of culpability attaching to the school's failure to diagnose the child's condition, and therefore affects the kind of relief appropriate in the case.' 46 An examination of the actual procedure that was used in diagnosing a child's condition and designing his educational program is useful in revealing whether the questioned placement decision-the diagnosis and its resultant educational program-was made on non-educational grounds. As already noted, a placement made for non-educational reasons such as discipline may comply with the Act in some circumstances even though the resulting educational program does not include every element necessary for maximum self-sufficiency. 147 In most situations, however, the requirements of the Act take precedence over decisions made on non-educational grounds. 148 Finally, the court must carefully determine whether the procedures that were followed, even if proper in form, adequately protected the interests of the child. Because the Act depends largely on parental involvement in the decision-making process, 49 a court should examine whether the child's parents were able to use the Act's remedial procedures effectively.' 50 Many parents are unable to afford a lawyer to assist in dealing with the Act's appeal process,1 5 ' and in such cases the court should give less credence to the result of the administrative appeal if it was unfavorable to the child.
D. General Considerations.
In deciding whether the goal of maximum self-sufficiency has been met in a particular case, a court may look to cases arising in similar districts or states.' 52 Similarities in other districts may also guide the school system in implementing the court's decision. Rarely, if ever, will two courts be presented with cases involving the same handicapping condition in the same educational context; courts should therefore draft their opinions narrowly to avoid creating inappropriately broad prece- Handicapped Children Act of 1975.159 The Act's legislative history reveals that Congress intended maximum self-sufficiency for the handicapped to be the mimimum goal of education under the Act, while allowing state and local governments to set incremental goals toward that end. 160
In determining whether the content of a child's education satisfies the self-sufficiency requirement and thereby brings a state into compliance with the Act, a court should require the state to provide every educational service necessary to enable the child to achieve the maximum level of self-sufficiency that is reasonable in his case. 1 6 1 Courts should recognize the traditionally local nature of educational policy formulation and should temper their concern for the child's well-being with an awareness of the need to preserve a proper relationship between the court and the community.
Ultimately, Congress should make a clear policy statement by amending the Act to require states to provide, at the least, every service reasonably necessary to maximize self-sufficiency. ). In addition, parental involvement would be more effective because clear guidelines would make it more evident when a child's rights were being violated. See Note, supra note 46, at I110.
